Great Example of an “Innovation Producer”

An article in the NYT a few days ago featured a young woman who managed to “invent” a prosthetic limb that would reduce phantom limb pain in amputees.

The story is great for many reasons. But my focus here is on the fact that this woman is not really an “inventor.” Instead, she is an “innovation producer” as that term and concept are developed in my forthcoming book Methodology: Art, Science, Technology, Law, and the Means of Innovation. In many ways I place greater importance on the role of the innovation producer than the pure inventor. Why? Because the innovation producer is able to bring together all the resources needed to take a cool idea or vision all the way to something that can be produced at a cost that makes it reasonably accessible to the market. In large part, this is because they are focused on the functional end they seek and not just cool technological means to get there. Technologically trained or focused inventors can get wedded to the technology they produce–including aesthetic ideals of “elegant” engineering solutions. I have nothing against the latter per se. But it can often blind the pure inventor to the realities of production, distribution, and the marketplace. In countless examples, the market has chosen the less elegant, but often cheaper or easier to use, version of two competing technological solutions to a given functional need/desire. VHS vs. Betamax is often given as a prime example of this. And this example makes another great point: no technology/invention is forever! So focusing on achieving the functionality at a reasonable price point in the market sooner rather than later is the goal–and value–of the innovation producer.

Categories: Commerce, Commercialization, Electrical & Digital Arts, Entrepreneurship, Goods/Artifacts, Innovation, Life & Health Sciences, Technology, Technology Entrepreneurship

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Reading the Fine Print: WikiLeaks, Twitter, and Website Terms of Service/Privacy Policies

Last week, Judge Liam O’Grady of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued a ruling denying three individuals’ objections to an order permitting the U.S. Government to access information about internet protocol (IP) addresses and other non-content data related to their use of Twitter. The Government procured the order as part of a criminal investigation.  In substantial part, the individuals argued that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy when using the Twitter service–at least as to the computers they used to access it and pages visited. Both the magistrate judge that originally issued the order and Judge O’Grady who reviewed the petition to quash the order pointed out that the individuals had explicitly agreed to Twitter’s terms of service and privacy policy when they created their Twitter accounts. These terms expressly permitted Twitter to disclose the IP addresses and other non-content data upon an appropriate court order.

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Categories: Commerce, Commercial/Contract Law, Information Technology, Law, Services

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Fixing Law School: Teaching Students how to be Great Lawyers

Today’s New York Times has an excellent article on the flaws of many law schools and law professors by David Segal. I wholeheartedly agree with nearly all of the critiques.

But I don’t like Segal’s failure to discover professors, programs, and classes that in fact are teaching students to be great lawyers. There are many of us, and we have made serious headway in reforming the old Langdell model of law teaching. I emphasize great lawyers, because Segal allows his interview subjects to frame the debate in terms of the tired and false dichotomy between “trade school” apprentice approaches and “best and brightest” academic research enterprises. The former emphasizes clinics and legal writing programs, and is caricatured as just teaching students the administrative and ministerial aspects of lawyering–law as a “mere trade.” The latter emphasizes doctrinal and theoretical classes, and is caricatured as “chin stroking” theoretical work untethered to the banalities of law in the real world.

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Categories: Law, Methods Tagged ,

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What Composers and Copyright Lawyers Can Teach Each Other (Updated Video Embeds)

In January 2010, I gave an unusual presentation at The Vera Project in Seattle, entitled What Composers and Copyright Lawyers Can Teach Each Other. Sponsored by Washington Lawyers for the Arts, it was based on demonstrations I have done with my guitar on music copyright issues for my IP classes. I had been doing these for years when one of my former students, Jennifer Chiang, asked if I’d be interested in doing it for a public audience through WLA. The raw video from the event was kicking around for a year until I was finally able to edit it into a decent form.

The presentation is broken down into three parts here. The audio is a bit distorted and the video is dark in places. But you can get a sense of the thing. Most of all, the presentation demonstrates a theme of this blog–that many important methods of creativity and innovation can’t really be reduced to propositional statements. As I mention in the video, I’ve held off on writing a law review article on these music copyright topics for years because it seemed too hopeless to translate into a text-only format that you can easily see and hear in this demonstration.

  • Part I explores the basics of rock song composition and copyright concepts, concluding with a detailed walk through of the issues in the ZZ Top-Chrysler litigation over the use of a segment of La Grange in a truck ad.
  • Part II demonstrates the evolution of famous blues and rock riffs that arguably form the “heart of the work” for some well-known classic rock songs.
  • Part III wraps up the presentation by showing how parts can be added by different players in the rehearsal space or recording studio, and how that might well affect who will be the “authors” of the underlying composition.

 

Categories: Art, Creativity, Fine Arts, Innovation, Intellectual Property, Law, Methods

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The Aftermath of Stanford v. Roche: Which Law of Assignments Governs?

Today, I’m reposting part two of the posts I wrote for the IPilogue on Stanford v. Roche.

Yesterday, I posted a summary of the background issues involved in the United States Supreme Court case of Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. (“Stanford v. Roche” or “Stanford”).[1] Now I want to follow up on the Court’s decision and, more importantly, the issues that decision left unresolved.

In line with my positions on the issues, the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit by rejecting Stanford’s argument that Bayh-Dole is a “vesting statute” (such as the Atomic Energy Act, in which title to relevant inventions is vested in designated agencies by act of law). It also reaffirmed its earlier holdings that rights in an invention belong to the inventor, absent some express transfer between the inventor and his employer or another.[2] To reach these conclusions, it focused on the definition under Bayh-Dole which requires that a “subject invention” (those inventions subject to the provisions of Bayh-Dole) be an “invention of the contractor.”[3] Under the majority’s view, the emphasized portion would be superfluous if any invention arising under federal funding were subject to Bayh-Dole. Instead, the Court held that a subject invention is one to which the contractor lawfully has rights or title. Most importantly, the title allocation rules under Bayh-Dole, which leave the inventor with only a conditioned residual interest where neither the government nor the contractor elect to take title, only apply to subject inventions.

While the Court was constrained to the Bayh-Dole issue by Stanford’s petition for certiorari, a concurrence and a dissent expressed concern over the Federal Circuit’s holding on the VCA issue.[4] Under these views, the majority’s holding on the Bayh-Dole issue, combined with the Federal Circuit case law, provides opportunity and incentive for inventors—and contractors—to circumvent Bayh-Dole’s title allocation system. For these justices, the Federal Circuit’s 1991 ruling in FilmTec Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc.[5] should be revisited.

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Categories: Commercial/Contract Law, Commercialization, Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property, Law, Science, Technology, Technology Entrepreneurship, Technology Transfer, University to Industry

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